Skepticism in Ancient Indian Philosophy- Some notes on Nagarjuna's Sunyata (Philosophy of Emptiness)

 

Who is a sceptic?

“A sceptic is a person who doubts only so that he may doubt and seeks nothing beyond uncertainty itself.” – Descartes

“…his (the sceptic’s) charge against our standards of proof is not that they work badly; he does not suggest that there are others that work better. The ground on which he attacks them is that they are logically defective, or if not defective, at any rate logically questionable.”- A J Ayer

 

Philosophical scepticism is born out of an uncompromising insistence on doubting everything.

As to whether the position of a sceptic in philosophy is a tenable one has been debated perpetually in Indian philosophical tradition.

Can it be claimed as ancient Nyaya philosophers do that the theoretical position of a sceptic is self-contradictory?

A tenable philosophical position?

Sceptics have often been portrayed as people whose insistence on doubting is out of all proportion; as people who question for the sake of questioning.

Ancient philosopher Udayana takes a jibe at philosophical sceptics by pointing out that being a person who does not believe what he does not see, a sceptic should stop believing that his wife is alive the moment he steps out of his house, and start mourning her death.

In a similar vein Russel has averred, ‘from blank doubt, no argument can begin’.

However, such arguments seldom put a sceptic in trouble. That he is not impractical is proven by the mere fact that he continues to subsist and is able to engage his adversaries in debates.

On a more serious note, he might retort that we are not discussing the sowing of crops or milking of cows. Our quest is of a purely theoretical nature, and hence he does not see the point of prejudging, or believing something beforehand- not even those things that seem obvious.

Or how could a person ever deny that the sun revolves around the earth? Since the sun is seen rising in the east and sinking down the western horizon every day. Doubting even the most obvious and commonplace is not unjustified,  and doing so does not necessarily render a person incapable of functioning in a practical manner in day-to-day life.

Nyaya critique of Shunyata-

But what if it could be demonstrated, as Nyaya philosophers try to, that skepticism involves an internal inconsistency? Their critique is presented in the form of a dilemma-

Nagarjuna says that all statements are uncertain. That all assertions are doubtful. If this is accepted as such, then does it not also mean that Nagarjuna’s statements too are devoid of meaning? Then Nagarjuna’s assertion that all theories about the nature of the universe are doubtful and uncertain, must itself be uncertain, and hence unworthy of being accepted.

This objection is not very different from asking whether baldness is a type of hairstyle. Or whether professing atheism is a kind of religious belief.

Can the assertion, ‘I deny all theories’, itself be understood as a theory?

And if it is indeed a theory then it rejects itself, as Nagarjuna himself maintains that no theory is certain.

Nyaya theorists put it thus, ‘If all bhavas are empty of their svabhava, then your utterance (vacana) that all bhavas are empty must also be empty of its sva-bhava for it is also a bhava.

Nagarjuna’s response to Nyaya-

Nagarjuna responds to this criticism in his Vigrahavyavartani as follows, ‘I have no proposition, no thesis to defend (which may lack sva-bhava/certainty). If I had any theses, I would have been guilty of the faults you ascribe to me. But I do not, hence I have no fault. “

Though in the first instance this appears to be a polemical response, this move allows Nagarjuna to take philosophers out of the realm of logic into mysticism. His response to a logical conundrum is silence.

This is not a silence meant to gloss over a theoretical difficulty, but rather a silence loaded with theoretical implications. A silence that conveys meaning without words.

When a math teacher says to his pupil-

‘Look at this question again’, what precisely is he asking him to look at?

Or, when a chess master tells his student to examine an unsolved puzzle again.

Is it possible to say what precisely he is asking him to reexamine?

What these students are being asked is to assume a stance of curiosity. The kind of stance one might have while carrying out an intricate operation. A stance that entails a quality of openness to all possibilities. It is difficult to pinpoint what it is exactly or to put it down in words, and yet we all know what it is- the sort of state of mind a child is in while solving a fun puzzle.

What does a person look at when he relooks at an unsolved question? Such relooking is falling back on an inquisitive instinct, which begins with not knowing and keeping all conclusions in suspension. Neither denying nor accepting what is already known and remaining open to radically different or new possibilities.

Can this stance of an enquirer be translated into the language of philosophy? This is precisely what Nagarjuna is trying to convey through his non-theory of sunyata.

Coming back to the critique raised by Pramana theorists-

Nagarjuna has a theory that all theories are of uncertain character. How does he justify his own theory?

Nagarjuna’s response is to accept the charge partially. He concedes that his own assertions are uncertain as well, but he refuses to accept that he has a theory.

His argument is that it is easily possible to imagine a world where all theories are devoid of certainty, and yet there is nobody to say it. Put differently, the fact that all theories are uncertain need not be stated by anyone; and this fact would still be true.

Let us use an analogy-

Three friends sit down to discuss metaphysics-

A says, “I believe God exists”.

B says, “I do not think that God exists.”

C who is our sceptic, says, “It is possible that God exists, and it is also possible that he does not exist. I do not know.”

Or, C could just remain silent and convey his doubts regarding both theories without saying anything. In doing so, he cannot be said to have proposed any theory whatsoever. He does not try to replace the existing theories but merely conveys his reluctance to go with them.

There is no contradiction in the position of the sceptic. He has posited no theory about God. He only refuses to commit to either side of the debate yet.

The sceptic cannot turn a blind eye to the libidinal investment behind the desire to be proven correct.

A sceptic would have no issues with keeping the validity of his own assertions on hold. Statements are to be taken as true only so long as they are practically useful and demonstrably valid.

Silence is the theoretical position of a Sunyata sceptic.

The position of a radical sceptic can be coherent only at the risk of being un-statable. This is perhaps the only way to translate the Madhyamika doctrine of silence into the language of philosophy and to posit radical skepticism in philosophy as a coherent theoretical position. One is reminded of Buddha who sometimes taught by conveying silence. Or simply twirling a flower in his hand.

A sceptic enters a debate only to prove the futility of all existing theories, without trying to establish anything. His philosophical activity consists of refutation only, not in asserting something. It is a simple refusal to commit to an assertion that can be falsified. His theoretical stance is not very different from a person who responds to a wedding invitation by saying, ‘I don’t promise to come, nor do I promise not to come’.

The main objective behind Nagarjuna’s style of argumentation was to make us see that our theories and formulations about our world are best described as myths- stories that we like to tell ourselves. The sceptic’s argument is supposed to lead to prajna (ultimate wisdom) and to make a transition from argumentation to mysticism.

For a radical sceptic, all philosophical questions remain open-ended. Even though he is not averse to accepting provisional theses.

There is no denying that a person who does not ever accept anything would find it impossible to function in the practical world. And a sceptic is certainly not a person who does not accept anything ever. If not for anything else then for the simple reason that refuting a theoretical opponent’s claims, accepting his perspective for the sake of examination, and inhabiting his intellectual edifice, just as he does. Only then do its inherent weaknesses become apparent. Therefore, scepticism cannot be understood as simply denying everything all the time. It is best understood as a stance that always keeps the doors of doubt open. It is very much possible for a philosophical sceptic to accept provisional theories for practical reasons.

Rejecting everything also implies being open to everything. Scepticism is not a path for the fainthearted and hypocrites, for it is one thing to say that all statements are uncertain and another thing to live by it. The stance of doubting everything, suspending all beliefs- including the most intimately held ones- is not merely an exercise in intellectual acrobatics. It entails letting go of one’s most primordial and obvious identifications. In radical rejection of everything, lies openness to everything- freedom in a radical sense.